Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Norms, ethics, philosophy: norms define which actions are permitted, advisable or prohibited when certain circumstances are present. The philosophical discussion deals mainly with questions of its justification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Group Psychology on Norms - Dictionary of Arguments
Haslam I 178 Norms/Group Psychology: the question of when and why norms for discrimination outweigh norms for fairness is hard to answer, the role of normative factors cannot be ruled out completely. Eliminating the role of self-interest has also proven much more difficult than originally thought, partly because people expect to receive rewards from the ingroup, and take this into account when allocating rewards among ingroup and outgroup members. >Group behavior/pychological theories, >Minimal group/Psychological theories, >Minimal groups/Tajfel. Spears/Otten: it seems there are plausible evolutionary reasons for people to put more trust in ingroups than outgroups and hence to act in terms of bounded reciprocity. At the same time, it appears that minimal ingroup bias can arise from the tendency to use the self as an anchor and to project self-interests onto the ingroup. (Spears et al., 2002(1), 2009(2)). >Distinctiveness/Group psychology, >Reciprocity/Psychological theories. Tajfel: substantial evidence has also accumulated for more group-level explanations of Tajfel and colleagues’ findings. These suggest that discrimination serves not only to enhance a positive sense of (collective) self but also to create positive group distinctiveness. 1. Spears, R., Jetten, J. and Scheepers, D. (2002) ‘Distinctiveness and the definition of collective self: A tripartite model’, in A. Tesser, J.V. Wood and D.A. Stapel (eds), Self and Motivation: Emerging Psychological Perspectives. Lexington, KY: APA. pp. 147–71. 2. Spears, R., Jetten, J., Scheepers, D. and Cihangir, S. (2009) ‘Creative distinctiveness: Explaining in-group bias in minimal groups’, in S. Otten, T. Kessler and K. Sassenberg (eds), Intergroup Relations: The Role of Motivation and Emotion; A Festschrift in Honor of Amélie Mummendey. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 23–40. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications - - - Haslam I 196 Norms/groupthink/dissent/Group psychology: recent research has identified several factors that facilitate group members’ critical evaluation of group norms and promote expressions of dissent. Some of these relate to individual differences. For example, dissent is greater among individuals who are both highly open to experience (i.e., more open to countervailing perspectives) and conscientious (i.e., motivated to act on information; Packer and Chasteen, 2010(1)). Situations: There are also situational effects. Perhaps most notable of these is an effect of abstraction such that identified and conscientious group members who are induced to think more abstractly (e.g., by adopting longer time perspectives) are also more likely to dissent from group norms (Packer, Fujita and Chasteen, 2013(2); Packer, Fujita and Herman, 2013(3)). 1. Packer, D.J. and Chasteen, A.L. (2010) ‘Loyal deviance: Testing the normative conflict model of dissent in social groups’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36: 5–18. 2. Packer, D.J., Fujita, K. and Chasteen, A.L. (2013) ‘The motivational dynamics of dissent decision: A goal-conflict approach’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5: 27–34. 3. Packer, D.J., Fujita, K. and Herman, S. (2013) ‘Rebels with a cause: A goal conflict approach to understanding when conscientious people dissent’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49: 927–32. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Group Psychology Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Group Psychology
> Counter arguments in relation to Norms
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28